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GROUP SIZE AND THE EFFICIENCY OF INFORMAL
RISK SHARING*
Emla Fitzsimons, Bansi Malde and Marcos Vera-Hernandez
This paper studies the relationship between group size and informal risk sharing. It shows that under
limited commitment with coalitional deviations, this relationship is theoretically ambiguous. It
investigates this question empirically using data on sibship size of household heads and spouses from
rural Malawi, exploiting a social norm among the main sample ethnic group to define the potential
risk-sharing group. We uncover evidence of worse risk sharing of crop losses in larger potential risk-
sharing groups, and rule out alternative explanations for the findings. A simple calibration exercise
indicates that our empirical findings are consistent with the theory.
Risk is a salient featureofdaily life in rural areasofdevelopingcountries.These contexts are
also characterised by market imperfections such as weak enforcement (also known as
limited commitment), costly monitoring, poor infrastructure and weak government
capacity; which lead to missing or incomplete insurance and credit markets, and an
absence of government social safety nets to help mitigate the effects of risk.1 Instead,
households rely on a variety of informal mechanisms, such as (informal) transfers and
loans from relatives and friends, to deal with the consequences of risk (Besley, 1995). Such
mechanisms areusually based on social ties and groups, such as family or friendship, which
are typically more effective in overcoming the aforementioned market imperfections
(Rosenzweig, 1988b; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Fafchamps
and Gubert, 2007; Angelucci et al., 2018).2 A sizeable literature finds that these informal
mechanisms are remarkably effective in helping households share risk, though they are
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1 A sizeable literature considers the implications of these imperfections on risk sharing: Kocherlakota
(1996), Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), Ligon et al. (2003) and Dubois et al. (2008) consider the implications
for the imperfect enforceability of contracts, while Ligon (1998) and Attanasio and Pavoni (2011) study issues
related to moral hazard, and Kinnan (2014) highlights the importance of hidden income.
2 For example, relatives have several opportunities to interact with one another, thus reducing the costs of
monitoring each other’s actions. Moreover, they could use strategies such as shame or even ostracism (both
of which are typically not feasible for formal insurance and credit providers to use) to punish renegers in
informal arrangements.
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unable toperfectlyprotecthouseholdwell-being.Recentworkhowever,mainly theoretical,
suggests that certain features of these groupsare likely to influencehoweffective theyare in
providing risk sharing (Bloch et al., 2008; Jackson et al., 2012).
This paper aims to study how one important characteristic of informal risk-sharing
groups – their size (or number of households in the group) – affects the amount of risk
sharing achieved. We first establish theoretical predictions, and then test these
predictions empirically in a setting characterized by almost no formal enforcement
mechanisms. Theoretically, in an environment where informal arrangements need to
be self-sustaining, two forces are at play in influencing the relationship between group
size and risk sharing: on the one hand, when households are sufficiently patient and
interactions are repeated, larger groups allow for more diversification of shocks,
leading to higher gains from sharing risk. On the other hand, as shown in the seminal
paper by Genicot and Ray (2003), when arrangements need to be robust to deviations
by sub-groups, larger groups can be destabilised by smaller sub-groups that are large
enough to provide significant levels of risk sharing, meaning that stable groups that
can sustain risk sharing are bounded from the top. This suggests that the relationship
between group size and risk sharing is unclear. We extend the set-up of Genicot and
Ray (2003) and use simulations to show that the relationship between group size and
risk sharing is theoretically ambiguous. The exact nature of the relationship between
group size and risk sharing is therefore an empirical question.
Conceptually, it is important todistinguish between the actual andpotential risk-sharing
group. Empirically, the former poses at least two challenges: first, it is difficult to measure
accurately,3 and second, it is endogenous since individuals sort into groups on the basis of
unobservedcharacteristics and shocks that are also correlatedwith risk sharing.Topartially
overcome this, much prior literature has taken the risk-sharing group to be a village
(Townsend, 1994, 1995).Though readily observable inmany socio-economic data sets, this
definition is likely to be too broad, especially since villages can have 500 or more
households. We instead focus on the sibship of the household head and spouse, a group
that is predetermined.4 To reflect the fact that not all members of this group will actually
share risk amongst each other, in what follows, we refer to it as ‘potential group size’.
In the context we study –Mchinji, Malawi – the instrumental role of the family in risk
sharing has been documented in the anthropology and sociology literatures (Phiri,
1983; Mtika and Doctor, 2002; Munthali, 2002; Peters et al., 2008). This is also
supported by our data, where the vast majority (80%) of transfers received by a
household are from family members. Thus, the number of siblings of the head and the
spouse are a relevant proxy for ‘potential group size’ in this setting. Moreover,
historical and well-documented social norms in Mchinji confer an important role on
the wife’s brothers (relative to her sisters) in ensuring her household’s well-being.
Whilst an individual’s sibship size is predetermined, it may still be correlated with
unobserved factors that are related with risk sharing. The norms not only allow us to
obtain a more fine grained measure of potential group size, but also provide us with an
3 For example, self-reports are subject to strategic behaviour as shown by Comola and Fafchamps (2017).
4 A large literature has documented the importance of the extended family for risk sharing in developing
countries (Rosenzweig, 1988a,b; Stark and Lucas, 1988; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Foster and Rosenzweig,
2001; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Witoelar, 2013; Angelucci et al., 2018).
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important dimension of heterogeneity that helps allay concerns around omitted
variable bias. In particular, we can use the wife’s sisters, distinct from brothers, to
construct placebo tests to help build confidence that our findings are not driven by
omitted variables associated with larger families.
To investigate the empirical relationship between group size and informal risk
sharing, we utilise a rich longitudinal dataset which includes information on
household consumption, crop loss (incidence and intensity) and the number of living
siblings of the head and spouse (referred to interchangeably as husband and wife,
respectively). We consider how well protected a household’s consumption is to
idiosyncratic crop losses – an important source of risk in our predominantly
agricultural setting – given the size of its extended family. Given the social norms
previously discussed, we define groups separately according to relationship to the
husband or wife (that is, we consider groups such as brothers of husband, brothers of
wife, etc.). The correlation between changes in log household consumption and the
incidence (and intensity) of household crop loss provides a measure of risk sharing
(Mace, 1991; Townsend, 1994; Attanasio and Szekely, 2004). We find that households
in which the wife has many brothers achieve worse risk sharing in response to crop
losses compared to households in which the wife has fewer brothers. A similar pattern,
though slightly weaker, is found for households where the husband has many sisters.
A concern is that these findings could be due to the fact that households where the
wife has many brothers (or husbands have many sisters) are poorer and, therefore,
more vulnerable to shocks. However, the fact that we fail to uncover a similar
relationship among households where the wife (husband) has many sisters (brothers),
alleviates this concern. Of course, such a comparison would form a valid placebo test
only if households where the wife (husband) has many sisters (brothers) are similar to
those where the wife (husband) has many brothers (sisters). We confirm this is the
case, by testing directly for differences in the age, education and ethnicity of these
household types. Additional robustness checks indicate that the findings are unlikely
to be explained by households with larger numbers of siblings being more vulnerable
to crop losses; or by increased competition for production resources, specifically land,
among families with many male siblings.
Lastly, we confirm that our empirical findings are compatible with Genicot and Ray
(2003). To do so, we calibrate the theoretical model using, where available, values from
the data. The calibrated model yields similar patterns between risk sharing and group
size as those found in the data, indicating that the threat of coalitional deviations can
explain our findings.
The article contributes to a number of strands of literature. It relates to a small
literature investigating the relationship between risk sharing and group size. A number
of studies show that the optimal risk sharing groups are likely to be small in the
presence of coalitional deviations (Genicot and Ray, 2003; Dubois, 2006; Chaudhuri
et al., 2010) and transaction costs (Murgai et al., 2002). However, when households can
choose the risks they face, and when they have heterogeneous risk preferences, larger
groups may become stable, as shown theoretically by Wang (2015).
It also relates to the literature investigating risk sharing in the presence of coalitional
deviations. Recent contributions extend theoretically Genicot and Ray (2003) to
characterise the optimal risk sharing contract when current transfers depend on past
© 2018 The Authors.
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transfers and shocks (Bold, 2009); and to allow for savings and the availability of formal
and informal risk-sharing institutions (Bold and Dercon, 2014). Bold and Dercon
(2014) also implement an empirical test of the model, using data from funeral
insurance groups in Ethiopia. However, they do not consider the relationship between
risk sharing and group size. Bold and Broer (2016) show that empirically observed
degrees of village-based risk sharing, and asymmetry of consumption responses to
positive and negative shocks, can be better explained by a model of limited
commitment with coalitional deviations than in a limited commitment model with
grim trigger strategies. Their model generates endogenous risk-sharing groups that are
small in size (one to five in practice), which provide some, but not complete,
insurance; and also generate, in line with Indian data, symmetric consumption
responses to positive and negative shocks.
Finally, the article contributes to the literature investigating the role of extended
families in risk sharing in developing countries. Recent work has documented that
market imperfections influence transactions and informal risk-sharing arrangements
within the family. For example, Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) document that limited
commitment, tempered by altruism, is at play in rural India, while DeWeerdt et al.
(2014) show that asymmetry of information among spatially dispersed extended family
networks affects inter-household transfer decisions in rural Tanzania. Baland et al.
(2016) document that transfers among siblings in Cameroon follow a system of
reciprocal credit, where older siblings support the education of younger siblings, with
the expectation that the younger siblings will reciprocate later.5 Our analysis
complements this literature by considering how the size of extended family networks
affects informal risk sharing.
The article is structured as follows. Section 1 lays out the conceptual framework, and
shows that the relationship between the amount of risk shared and group size is
theoretically ambiguous when coalitions can deviate. Section 2 provides details on the
data, and the social context, focusing particularly on norms governing extended family
relationships in rural Malawi. Section 3 discusses the empirical specification; while
Section 4 contains our main results and robustness checks. Section 5 outlines findings
of the model calibration. Section 6 concludes.
1. Conceptual Framework
We consider optimal risk sharing in environments subject to imperfect enforceability
of contracts. This assumption matches well our empirical setting – rural Malawi – where
formal enforcement mechanisms are rarely available. We draw on the set-up in Genicot
and Ray (2003), GR hereon, and add to their analysis by considering explicitly (using
numerical simulations) the relationship between the extent of risk sharing and
potential group size.
Households are part of a potential risk-sharing group (in our case, brothers/sisters
of the head and spouse) of size n. The size of the potential risk-sharing group is
exogenously set. Households face a risky endowment, that takes on two values: h or l;
5 This literature also finds that social pressure to make transfers among kin leads to less optimal
investment decisions, especially for women (Jakiela and Ozier, 2016).
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h ≥ l. The probability of drawing an endowment h in any period is p; 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Households are ex ante identical, risk averse and gain utility from consumption.
Household utility is increasing, concave and twice-continuously differentiable. There is
no storage technology, and neither formal credit nor insurance is available.
To cope with the consequences of risk, households can make and receive transfers
following a transfer rule that depends on the number of households in the group that
receive the high endowment shock: when a household receives h, and k  1 other
households also receive h, each household receiving h sends a transfer tk to a common
pool, which is then shared equally among those receiving l. Consumption for households
receiving h is thus h  tk, while that for those receiving l is l þ ktk=ðn  k).6
Households observe the endowments, consumption and transfers made and
received by all other households in the group. However, this setting is subject to the
imperfect enforceability of contracts. Thus, the transfer arrangement needs to be self-
sustaining. In particular, it needs to be such that no individual or sub-group wants to
deviate from the arrangement i.e. it should be coalition-proof. The specific definition
of coalition-proofness is as in Bernheim et al. (1987), which places a further restriction
that sub-groups that deviate should themselves be robust to further deviations. Thus,
arrangements need to be self-sustaining to deviations that are themselves credible.
Given the transfer rule, and thecoalition-proofness condition, and focusingonstationary
arrangements, the optimal risk sharing arrangement (i.e. transfer in each state) can be
recovered from the following optimisation problem (expressed in per-period terms):
max
tk
vðt ;nÞ ¼ pnuðhÞ þ ð1 pÞnuðlÞ þ
Xn1
k¼1
pðk;nÞ k
n
uðh  tkÞ þ n  k
n
u l þ ktk
n  k
  
;
(1)
subject to:
ð1 dÞuðh  tkÞ þ dvðt ;nÞ ð1 dÞuðhÞ þ dvðsÞ 8s k; (2)
where d is the discount factor, and v*(s) is the per-period expected utility a household
could get by deviating to a stable sub-group of size s, and sharing risk in this sub-group in
all subsequent periods. The incentive compatibility constraints in (2) imply that the
transfer arrangement should be such that the per-period discountedutility for households
that achieve a good shock in the current period and make a transfer tk to the common
pool, and expect to achieve future expected utility of v(t, n) is greater than the utility it can
achieve from deviating in a sub-group s where it consumes h this period and shares risk
with the sub-group s in the future thus attaining an expected future utility of v*(s).7
6 Note that the transfer rule makes use of the fact that the group-level aggregate budget constraint for
each period must be satisfied.
7 This formulation considers deviations by households that receive a good shock only. Genicot and Ray
(2003) argue that it is necessary and sufficient to check only the enforcement constraints for stable subsets of
households receiving a good shock when considering symmetric stationary strategies. Those receiving a bad
shock (who are recipients of transfers in this state) could be induced to join a sub-group of households
receiving a good shock only under very special circumstances. In particular, there needs to be some
coordination failure (or belief of this) among households receiving a bad shock for some household in this
group to be tempted to join the deviating group of households with good shocks.
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When no incentive compatibility constraint binds, the first-best allocation, which
equalises consumption for all households within the group for each state of the world,
is achieved. By contrast, in autarky, when no risk sharing occurs, households consume
their own endowment in each period, achieving a per-period expected utility of
pu(h) + (1  p)u(l).
Based on this set-up, GR show that a stable risk-sharing arrangement may fail to exist
for many group sizes, even for high values of the discount factor.8 Moreover, they show
that the size of stable risk-sharing groups is bounded from above: essentially, large
groups are not stable in the presence of coalitional deviations, since households
receiving a good shock can deviate to form sub-groups within which they can still benefit
from group-based insurance in the future. Thus, in larger groups, the outside option
may potentially be better than in smaller groups (depending on the sizes of possible
stable sub-coalitions). Thus, the transfer made by those receiving h will be lower than in
arrangements sustained by ostracising a deviator to autarky in the future. This is because
those receiving h need to be induced to remain in the group rather than deviate to a sub-
group, which could provide higher utility than autarky. In some cases, no positive
transfer exists, leading to the non-existence of a stable risk sharing arrangement.9
Our contribution, relative to GR, is to show within the same set-up that the
relationship between the amount of risk sharing and potential group size is ambiguous.
The fact that a stable arrangement may not exist for many group sizes, complicates this
exercise.10 In particular, it is not possible to study this analytically. We instead use
numerical simulations to shed light on the relationship.
We need to take a stand on how risk is shared in potential groups of size n where no
stable risk-sharing arrangement exists. One possibility is that households remain in
autarky. However, this is not very satisfactory, especially since within this set-up,
households can deviate from an autarky punishment by cooperating with sub-groups of
households. Thus, given that households are ex ante identical in this setting, a natural
assumption is that in cases where no stable arrangement exists for a potential group of
size n, the potential group randomly partitions into stable sub-groups in a manner so as
to maximise the sum of expected utility:
Xn
i¼1
X
s2S
ns  s  viðt ; sÞ; (3)
where S is the set of stable coalitions (or groups), and i indexes households in the
group.11 In other words, we assume that there exists a social planner who chooses a
8 In models where the risk-sharing arrangement is sustained by ostracising individuals who deviate (i.e.
deviating individuals revert to autarky in future periods), a stable arrangement may fail to exist when the
discount factor is low. When arrangements need to be coalition proof, however, a stable arrangement may fail
to exist even if the discount factor is sufficiently high.
9 When arrangements can be non-stationary, a larger group could be stable. This is because only a sub-set,
rather than all, of potential deviators need to be compensated to remain in the risk sharing arrangement.
Nonetheless, GR show that the size of the largest stable group will still be bounded from the top (though it
could be larger than the largest stable group under stationary arrangements).
10 Moreover, as indicated by GR, the existence or not of a stable arrangement for groups of size greater
than two is sensitive to parameter values.
11 This need not be the only way by which the group partitions, particularly when households are allowed
to be heterogeneous. For example, partitions could emerge endogenously as in Ambrus et al. (2014), who
allow for different transfers to be made between pairs of households embedded in a network.
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combination of stable sub-groups such that the sum of expected utility (as in (3)) is
maximised, and then randomly sorts households into these sub-groups.12,13 We can then
calculate the expected utility of a household in the unstable potential group of size n as
the weighted average of the expected utilities associated with the combination of stable
sub-groups (the actual risk-sharing group) thatmaximises thepotential group’s expected
utility, with weights calculated as the probability of being randomly assigned to a
particular sub-group. To be precise, the household’s weighted average expected utility isX
s2S :s stable
psviðt ; sÞ; (4)
where ps is the probability of being in the stable group s. This is the social planner’s
objective function. The value of this function increases as fluctuations in a household’s
consumption fall: a larger stable group will have a higher value of vi(t, s) since:
(i) the probability of states where all households receive the same shock falls with
group size, and so there is more scope for risk sharing; and
(ii) households have concave utility.
1.1. Simulations
To simulate the model, we make some assumptions about the functional form of the
utility function, and the parameter values. In the examples we show here, we use the
same parameter values as in GR (Example 2).14 Utility is assumed to be of the constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) form:
uðcÞ ¼ c
ð1qÞ  1
ð1 qÞ ;
where q is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. n is assumed to be 10, q is assumed to
be 1.6, d = 0.83, h = 3 and l = 2 as in GR. Finally, the probability of receiving the high
endowment is p = 0.4. With this set of parameter values, only sub-coalitions of size one,
two and three are stable, as reported in GR and documented in Table 1.
Given this set of stable sub-groups, we evaluate the model’s implications on the
relationship between the extent of risk sharing and potential group size; as well as
those for welfare. Risk sharing is measured using a standard measure used in the
literature (Townsend, 1994), which can also be derived from the model. The measure
makes use of the fact that under perfect risk sharing, the ratio of marginal utility of
consumption across states should move one-to-one with changes in aggregate
12 In doing so, we assume that unstable potential groups are arranging themselves in a manner so as to
generate the highest possible insurance for their members.
13 Since households are ex ante identical, we assume that the social planner places equal weight on each
household when deciding how to allocate households in unstable groups to stable sub-groups. However, this
assumption can be relaxed easily to allow for arbitrary planner weights. However, note that the transfer rule,
and thus expected utility, vi(t, s), will be the same for all households.
14 We use these parameter values so as to illustrate what happens to the extent of risk sharing in a
documented case where only a small number of potential group sizes is stable. In Section 5, we illustrate the
patterns of risk sharing and potential group size that emerge when we set the parameter values to match our
data.
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resources, and hence be unaffected by idiosyncratic shocks. With CRRA utility, this
implies that Dlog(cigt) will be uncorrelated with (negative) idiosyncratic shocks, which
we will denote as Dshockigt, when risk is perfectly shared through the transfer
arrangement. A negative correlation implies that risk is not perfectly shared, with the
magnitude providing an indication of the extent of risk sharing: the closer it is to 0, the
higher the amount of risk sharing. Welfare is measured using the planner’s expected
utility as in (4).
In order to document the relationship between potential group size and the extent
of risk sharing, we use the simulated data to estimate
D logðcigtÞ ¼ k0 þ
XN
n¼1
hnDshockigt  1ðSig ¼ nÞ þ sgt þ Digt ; (5)
where Dlog(cigt) is the change in log consumption for household i of potential group g
between t and t  1, shockigt = 1[yigt = l] is an indicator of whether household i from
group g drew the low income realisation, l, at time t, sgt are potential group-time fixed
effects and eigt is an error term. Perfect risk sharing implies that hn = 0.
Figure 1 displays the relationship between the risk-sharing measure and potential
group size (top panel) and welfare and potential group size (bottom panel). The
figures indicate that households are best insured and achieve the highest expected
utility when the potential group size is three, which corresponds to the largest stable
group size. For larger potential group sizes, both risk sharing and weighted expected
utility fluctuates in a zig-zag pattern. This zig-zag pattern is a result of the integer
constraint and of our assumption concerning how households sort into stable groups
when the potential group is not stable. To see how, in a potential group of size four,
one household would be in autarky, while the other three households could cooperate
together in a stable group. Hence, the expected utility of a household is made of the
utility of being in a stable group of three with probability 0.75, and of being in autarky
with probability 0.25. Consequently, the expected utility of a household belonging to a
potential group of size four is smaller than that of a household belonging to a potential
group of size three. When the potential group is of size six, two stable groups of size
three are formed, and hence households enjoy the same average utility (bottom panel)
Table 1
Stable Groups
Group size Parameter set A
1 U
2 U
3 U
4 9
5 9
6 9
7 9
8 9
9 9
10 9
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–0.36
–0.34
–0.32
–0.30
–0.28
–0.26
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Parameter Estimate Lower 95% Confidence Limit
Upper 95% Confidence Limit
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0.662
0.663
0.664
0.665
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0.667
0.668
0.669
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1. Potential Group Size, Risk Sharing and Welfare – Example from Genicot and Ray (2003)
Notes. The figure shows the relationship between risk sharing (top) and potential group size; and
weighted average expected utility (bottom) and potential group size. Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com.
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as when the potential group is of size three, which creates the zig-zag pattern (we
explain below why a similar pattern does not emerge for the risk-sharing measure).15
Something to note about the zig-zag pattern described above is that the
household expected utility is never higher than the utility of a household whose
potential group coincides with the largest stable group (size three in the example
above). Hence, the average expected utility across potential group sizes which are
larger than the largest stable group is always smaller than the average expected
utility of households whose potential group coincides with the largest stable group.
Interestingly, the risk-sharingmeasure (toppanel) is lower for thepotential group sizes
of six and nine than the potential group of size three, whilst they enjoy the same expected
utility. This highlights the difference between measuring welfare and measuring risk
sharing against idiosyncratic shocks. Whilst welfare is affected by all states of nature,
including those with aggregate shocks, only states of nature in which it is possible to share
risk contribute to the risk sharing measure (and hence the need to include sgt in (5) to
account for aggregate shocks at the potential group level).When the potential group is of
size three, if all group members draw the same income realization (aggregate shock),
there is no scope to share risk but this does not contribute to the identification of h3
because of sgt, which absorbs the effect of the aggregate shock. For a potential group of
size six, households will sort into two groups of three, say group A and group B. With
positive probability, there will be states where all households in group A experience the
same income draw, while those in group B have amixture of low and high income draws.
Contrary to the potential group of size three, the inability of group A to share risk
contributes to the identification of h6 because not all households in the potential group
of six draw the same income level. In other words, because the shock was not an aggregate
one, there were risk-sharing possibilities in the potential group of six which were not
exploited because they divided in two groups of three.
As is clear from the above discussion, what is driving the results is that households sort
themselves into groups, which are smaller in size than the potential group. Although
coalitional deviations is a natural way to obtain this endogenously, the same result would be
achieved if households create small risk-sharing groups for some exogenous reason.
Indeed, other models might also imply that the size of the optimal risk-sharing group is
smaller than the whole potential group. The presence of coordination costs that are
increasing ingroup sizecouldalso yielda similarpattern, as shownbyMurgai et al. (2002).16
To be noted, though, and documented by GR, is that the stability of groups is
sensitive to parameter values. In particular, changing the parameters q, p, h and l a little
can change which group sizes are stable.17 This is displayed in Figure A.1 in the online
Appendix A.2, which plots the two measures of the degree of risk sharing for different
levels of h and l. The values of these variables have been selected so as to have the same
average endowment, but different variances. A higher variance implies a greater need
for insurance. The figure indicates that as the need for insurance increases, larger
15 A detailed overview of the calculations that yield Figure 1 is in online Appendix A.1.
16 However, to our knowledge, no work has characterised the relationship between the extent of risk
sharing and potential group size.
17 From the repeated games literature, it is well known that groups of size two can be unstable for low levels
of the discount factor, d. The instability noted here for larger groups arises even when d is high.
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potential groups become stable, and these groups achieve better risk sharing than
smaller potential groups. This is best displayed by the line corresponding with the
highest need for insurance (l = 1.0; h = 4.5), and is the lowest line in the left panel of
online Appendix Figure A.1. This line increases monotonically up to potential group
size seven. By contrast, when the need for insurance is low (l = 2.2; h = 2.7), a case
depicted by the top-most line in the left panel of online Appendix Figure A.1, no
potential group of size >1 is stable.18
2. Context and Data
Our empirical setting is Malawi, one of the world’s most impoverished countries,
ranking 173rd out of 182 countries on the Human Development Index. Over 80% of
its population lives in rural areas, with subsistence agriculture providing the main
source of income for a substantial proportion. Infrastructure in rural areas is very weak,
with just one in sixteen households having access to electricity, and one in five
households having access to piped water.19 The main crops grown are maize, tobacco
and ground nuts. Agriculture is mainly rain-fed, so agricultural production and
associated income are highly dependent on unpredictable weather. Access to formal
insurance and financial products and services is low, with only 3% of adults holding an
insurance product and less than 20% a formal bank account.20 Instead social
connections, particularly family, are important for sharing risk.
2.1. Data Description and Sample Selection
We use data from the Mai Mwana–IFS Economic Survey, a longitudinal survey collected
in collaboration with the authors in Mchinji District to evaluate two randomised health
interventions, a volunteer infant feeding counselling intervention and a women’s
group intervention.21 The survey interviewed approximately 3,000 women aged 17–43
and their households living in approximately 600 villages across the Mchinji District. It
collected detailed information on household consumption, adverse events, individual
labour supply, health indicators, assets and demographics, and, guided by this research
question, information on extended family networks within and outside the village.
There are two waves of data, in 2008–9 and 2009–10. The longitudinal nature of the
data allows us to better control for household-level unobserved variables that are
correlated with our measure of potential group size, crop losses and risk sharing.
We restrict the analysis to the following sample:
(i) households living in control areas;
(ii) households where the main respondent was resident in the same village over
both surveys;
18 Average expected utility is nonetheless higher in this case (even in autarky) since the variance of the
endowment is much lower.
19 Source. National Statistics Office (2008).
20 Source. Finscope Malawi (2009).
21 See Lewycka et al. (2013) and Fitzsimons et al. (2016b) for findings of the related impact evaluation.
The data are available to download at http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue?sn=6996.
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(iii) households where the main respondent in our survey was either the head or
the spouse; and
(iv) villages with more than one household surveyed.
Restriction (i) is imposed since the interventions could have altered risk-sharing
arrangements within the village, for instance by altering social interactions or
improving community cooperation (particularly in the case of the women’s groups).22
Restriction (ii) is imposed to allow us to correctly account for village-level aggregate
shocks.23 We impose restriction (iii) to ensure that we are studying the networks of
individuals with relatively similar intrahousehold bargaining power in the sample.
Finally, (iv) is imposed because we control for village fixed effects.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of our analysis sample. It contains 524
households living in 102 villages. Note that we recode the male member of a couple
(where available) to be the head, while the female member is designated to be the
spouse. Both the head and spouse have low levels of education on average, with
approximately 16% (7.4%) of household heads (spouses) having some secondary
Table 2
Sample Descriptives
Variable N Mean SD
Husband has no education (yes = 1) 477 0.140 0.348
Husband has some primary (yes = 1) 477 0.222 0.416
Husband has completed primary (yes = 1) 477 0.478 0.500
Husband has at least some secondary (yes = 1) 477 0.159 0.366
Husband’s years of education 477 5.157 3.514
Wife has no education (yes = 1) 524 0.256 0.437
Wife has some primary (yes = 1) 524 0.273 0.446
Wife has completed primary (yes = 1) 524 0.397 0.490
Wife has at least some secondary (yes = 1) 524 0.074 0.263
Wife’s years of education 524 3.435 3.229
Age of husband 478 37.464 10.110
Age of wife 524 32.648 8.843
Household size 524 5.708 2.123
No. kids <6 years 524 1.403 0.958
No. kids aged 6–12 years 524 1.187 1.031
No. individuals aged >12 years 524 3.115 1.347
Household owns dwelling (yes = 1) 524 0.937 0.243
Household owns land (yes = 1) 524 0.840 0.367
Household has good floor (yes = 1) 524 0.099 0.299
Household has good roof (yes = 1) 524 0.210 0.408
No. sleeping rooms 524 2.076 1.017
Household has access to piped water (yes = 1) 524 0.078 0.269
Household has improved latrine (yes = 1) 524 0.073 0.260
Notes. The table includes households resident in the same village over both rounds of the Mai Mwana–IFS
survey, and where the main respondent was married, and either the head or spouse of her household. Data
for some husbands is missing if they are not living in the household at the time of the survey, but are still
married to the wife.
22 Fitzsimons et al. (2016a) find suggestive evidence of this.
23 Around 18% of the survey main respondents in the data migrated to another village between 2008–9
and 2009–10. The primary reason for migration was marriage. In additional analysis, we checked whether
migration was systematically related with the crop loss, and found no evidence of this.
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schooling or higher. Husbands are older than their wives by on average around five
years. Households have on average just over five members, and most own their own
dwelling and land. However, the quality of housing is very poor, and households have
extremely limited access to water and sewage infrastructure.
2.2. Defining the Risk-sharing Group
We here discuss how we define the potential risk-sharing group. As noted earlier, formal
financialmarkets are all but absent inMchinji, and there was no government safety net in
place at the time of the surveys.24 Evidence from the anthropology and sociology
literature indicates that social connections, and in particular, the extended family, play a
critical role in helping households deal with the consequences of risk and adverse events.
For instance, Trinitapoli et al. (2014) documents the role of older siblings in protecting
educational investments of younger siblings, while Munthali (2002) and Peters et al.
(2008) document the instrumental role of the family in fostering and taking care of
children orphaned byHIV/AIDS.We also find support for this in our data. In particular,
in response to a question on who they expect to receive informal monetary transfers,
loans or gifts from in the event of an income loss due to adverse idiosyncratic events
(displayed in Table 3), households expect to receive support from two family members
and one friend, at themedian. The average indicates the opposite pattern, though this is
driven by a small number of households who can turn to a large number of friends.25
Our data also allows us to look at the actual amounts of transfers, loans or gifts
(monetary or in-kind) given to and received from family and friends (Table 4) in the
year prior to the survey. The data indicates, on average, households give an annual
amount of around 375 MK to family, and receive on average 321 MK. Their transactions
with friends are much lower, by a magnitude of two and a half times, with 113 MK given
on average and 87 MK received from friends. These pieces of evidence confirm that the
extended family is a critical source of risk sharing in this setting. Given the importance
of family for risk sharing, we define ‘potential group size’ based on family.
Further anthropological evidence allows us to refine the potential group, in addition
to motivating a robustness check to rule out any lingering endogeneity concerns
relating to this definition. Within the family, customs are such that a wife’s brothers
Table 3
Number of Potential Sources of Support Following Adverse Idiosyncratic Event
Source of support Mean Median SD
Family 1.69 2 1.68
Friends 1.94 1 2.31
N 1,048
Notes. This table shows the number of different individuals with a specific social relationship that a household
expects to receive help from if it experiences an income loss as a result of an idiosyncratic adverse event.
24 A cash transfer programme, the Mchinji Cash Transfer, was being piloted in a small number of villages
in Mchinji at the time of the survey. Less than 3% of households in our sample report receiving the transfer.
25 1% of households report being able to turn to 10 or more friends in case of an adverse event.
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should play an important role in ensuring the well-being of her family. The
predominant ethnic group in our sample, the Chewa, are a matrilineal and matrilocal
ethnic group (Richards, 1950; Phiri, 1983; Mtika and Doctor, 2002). Under matrilineal
traditions, society confers a special role on an individual’s maternal family, resulting in
a close bond between siblings, even after marriage. Moreover, a woman’s brothers play
a crucial role in supporting her family: her eldest brother is responsible for ensuring
access of a woman’s family to production resources, healthcare and other items
important for household welfare. As a result, children will consult with their maternal
uncles as they are responsible for arranging marriages, ensuring the children have
access to adequate land and other productive resources, as well as health care (Phiri,
1983; Mtika and Doctor, 2002).
The literature indicates that some practices may be less relevant today, while other
aspects of matriliny have proven to be remarkably resilient over time. For instance, the
practice of matrilocality – whereby the husband moves to the wife’s home after
marriage – has waned somewhat in Mchinji, with about a half of couples in our sample
living in the husband’s village of birth when interviewed, and the other half living in
the wife’s village of birth. At the same time, however, children are still considered to
‘belong’ to their mother’s matriline, and the maternal relatives become their key
caretakers following her death (Munthali, 2002).
In terms of risk-sharing arrangements, data on interhousehold transfers from the
Family Transfers Project (collected as part of the Malawi Longitudinal Study of
Families and Health26) indicates that a wife’s brothers remain an important source for,
and recipient of, transfers in a household: 33% (41%) of couples report having
received (given) a material transfer from (to) the wife’s brothers in the past growing
season, a period of around three to five months. Moreover, they are less likely to
receive material transfers from a wife’s sisters (26% report receiving a material
transfer), and transfers received are of lower magnitude (351 MK on average is
Table 4
Transfers Given to and Received from Family and Friends
Source of support
Support given Support received
Support
given + received
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Family 375.11 1,485.83 321.22 1,567.91 696.78 2,378.13
Friends 113.59 677.72 87.65 599.74 201.24 919.48
N 1,048 1,048 1,048
Notes. This table shows the amounts given to (left panel), received from (middle panel), and given to and
received from (right panel) individuals with a specific social relationship by the household in the year prior
to the survey for wave one and between surveys for wave two. All amounts are in Malawi Kwacha. The
exchange rate at the time of the survey was around US$1 = 140 MK.
26 The Malawi Longitudinal Study of Families and Health is a longitudinal cohort study collecting data on
a range of socio-economic and health variables in three areas of Malawi, including Mchinji District. Data are
available on around 4,000 individuals from 1998–2012.
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received from brothers, compared to 119 MK from sisters).27 The evidence thus
suggests that the brothers of the wife are likely to still play an important role in risk
sharing for the household.28 We thus define the potential risk sharing group to be the
number of brothers (and separately, sisters) of the husband and wife.
2.3. Crop Losses
2.3.1. Measuring crop losses
Unexpected crop losses provide our measure of shocks in the analysis.29 Such crop
losses could occur as a result of pests, variation in weather (the effects of which could
vary within a village by the type of soil, and other characteristics of the land) and other
such factors. The first (second) survey collected information on whether the household
experienced any crop loss in the year preceding the survey (since the first survey); and if
so, the household head was asked to estimate how much revenue was lost as a result.30
We use this information to construct two measures of crop loss: the first is a dummy
variable equal to one if the household experienced a crop loss event, thereby measuring
the incidence of a crop loss; the second is potential revenue lost normalised by a
measure of ‘permanent’ consumption, thereby capturing the intensity of the crop loss.31
Crop losses are prevalent in this setting, as is evident from Table 5: around 24% of
households in our sample experienced a crop loss over the two-year period, losing on
average, just over 3,700 MK. This amount corresponds to around one-third of average
monthly household food consumption. Among those who experienced a loss, the
average loss is around 13,000 MK, or 125% of average monthly household consump-
tion. More crop losses were observed in the year prior to the 2008–9 survey than the
2009–10 one, and the losses experienced were also larger.
Finally, there is some persistence in crop losses among those who experienced a loss.
From Table 6, we see that around 8% of households experience a crop loss in both
survey rounds, which is higher than what we would expect if crop losses were
independently distributed.32
27 These figures come from 220 observations, and are not adjusted for the number of siblings, or other
variables.
28 Importantly, the norm does not imply that sisters cannot help each other, or their brothers. Our
empirical set-up allows for the possible asymmetry in risk-sharing relationships that could be generated by the
norm. In subsection 4.2.3, we consider an extension of the theoretical framework that allows for this
asymmetry and the social norm.
29 Crop losses have been used as a measure of adverse events by previous studies e.g. Beegle et al. (2006).
30 The questions were as follows: ‘In the last year (since the last survey) did this household suffer from a
bad harvest or crop loss?’ and ‘How much potential revenue was lost as a result of the loss?’
31 Households that experience larger losses may be wealthier and better able to build up buffer stocks to
deal with the consequences of risk, in which case we would erroneously conclude that households are well
insured. To deal with this, we normalise the potential revenue lost by a measure of the household’s
permanent consumption. Household permanent consumption is measured as the component of household
consumption predicted by the education of the female main respondent as in 2004. We also experimented
with using household asset holdings in 2004 and quality of house in 2004, in addition to the education of the
female main respondent, to predict household consumption. A concern with using past household assets,
however, is that they may be correlated with a household’s ability to currently smooth consumption,
particularly if crop loss events are persistent. Results using this measure are available on request.
32 Under the assumption that the crop loss distributions for the two years are independent, the probability of
experiencing a crop loss in both survey rounds is the product of the probability of experiencing a crop loss in
2008–9 and theprobability of experiencing a crop loss in 2009–10, whichequates to around5.4%ofhouseholds.
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2.3.2. Are crop losses idiosyncratic within the village?
The objective of the article is to investigate how the amount of idiosyncratic risk shared
by a household varies with the size of its extended family. For our tests to have
sufficient power, we require that there is sufficient variation within villages in the
incidence of crop losses.33 Such variation may arise as a result of differences in land
quality, with some plots more resilient than others to poor weather; some crop varieties
more resilient to poor weather; or due to localised pests or crop diseases. Note that
there was no drought or widespread flooding in Mchinji over the survey period.
Nonetheless, we investigate the amount of idiosyncratic variation in our data. To do
this, Figure 2 displays histograms of the within-village variation in the incidence of a
Table 5
Crop Losses, by Year
N Mean SD
Overall sample
Crop loss incidence 1,048 0.242 0.429
Income lost (’000s MK) 1,044 3.756 19.337
2008–9
Crop loss incidence 524 0.303 0.460
Income lost (’000s MK) 524 5.536 26.310
2009–10
Crop loss incidence 524 0.181 0.386
Income lost (’000s MK) 520 1.962 6.891
Notes. Sample includes households resident in the same village across the two surveys, and where the main
respondent was married at the time of the survey and either the head or spouse of the head.
Table 6
Persistence of Crop Losses
Crop loss in 2009–10
No Yes Total
Crop loss in 2008–9 No 312 53 365
(59.54) (10.11) (69.66)
Yes 117 42 159
(22.33) (8.02) (30.34)
429 95 524
(81.87) (18.13) (100)
Notes. Sample includes households resident in the same village across the two surveys, and where the main
respondent was married at the time of the survey and is either the head or spouse of the head. Percentages in
each category displayed in parentheses, underneath number of households.
33 As we will show below, ideally we would like to be able to control for within-group shocks. However, we
are unable to do this since we do not observe information on all members of the group. Controlling for
aggregate village shocks allows us to partially account for common shocks experienced by group members in
the village.
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crop loss, for each round of data. We see from the figure that there are a number of
villages with idiosyncratic variation in the incidence of crop losses.
2.4. Measuring Extended Family Networks
To investigate the relationship between the extent of risk sharing and the size of the
extended family, we collected information in the survey on the numbers of siblings of
the main respondent and her spouse. Data were collected on the numbers of siblings
in the village and the number alive,34 and on the location of residence of the
respondent’s mother and mother-in-law. We use the numbers of siblings as the
measure of potential group size. The two surveys – conducted approximately one year
apart – captured similar numbers of siblings for a large part of our sample. However,
there were some discrepancies in a sizeable minority (~30%) of observations, which
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Fig. 2. Variation in Crop Loss Incidence within Villages
Notes. The figure plots a histogram for the proportion of households in each village that
experienced a crop loss in wave 1 of the survey (left panel) and in wave 2 (right panel). For
legibility of the graph, a peak at 0 with magnitude 10 has been omitted. Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com.
34 The exact wording of the questions was as follows: Please tell me how many of the following categories of
relatives are currently alive, regardless of where they live: 1. Sisters, 2. Sisters-in-law, 3. Brothers, 4. Brothers-in-
law. Please tell me how many of the following categories of relatives are currently living in this village: 1.
Sisters, 2. Sisters-in-law, 3. Brothers, 4. Brothers-in-law. Note that in our survey, sisters-in-law and brothers-in-
law were translated in a manner so as to capture the siblings of one’s spouse.
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could not be explained by naturally occurring changes (e.g. deaths or divorce), and
thus point towards reporting errors. To mitigate effects of such errors, we take the
average of the reported information in both surveys as the preferred measure of
potential group size. Moreover, we use information from the household roster, along
with this data, to construct measures of the number of siblings of the husband and wife
living outside the household.
Tables 7 and 8 provide some descriptive statistics of sibling networks in this context.
Virtually all households have a sibling link outside the household, and a lower, though
sizeable proportion (~82%), has siblings within the same village. Households have on
average nine siblings outside the household, of whom close to three are within the
same village. The high numbers of siblings (relative to Western contexts) reflects the
high fertility rates in Malawi: the total fertility rate35 in rural areas was estimated to be
around 7.6 in 1984, falling slightly to 6.7 by 2000. At the individual level, almost all
Table 7
Any Family Links
Any sibling
link
Any sibling link
of husband
Any sibling
link of wife
Any links
Husband Wife
Brothers Sisters Brothers Sisters
Alive 0.996 0.971 0.985 0.908 0.908 0.941 0.933
(0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
In same village 0.819 0.666 0.531 0.534 0.517 0.418 0.437
(0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.030)
Notes. The table includes households resident in the same village over both survey rounds, and where the
main respondent is married, and is either the head or spouse of her household.
Table 8
Numbers of Family Links
No. sibs of
husband + wife
No. sibs of
husband
No. sibs
of wife
Number of
Husband Wife
Brothers Sisters Brothers Sisters
Alive 9.418 4.422 5.162 2.281 2.267 2.519 2.740
(0.172) (0.098) (0.113) (0.064) (0.068) (0.069) (0.079)
In same village 2.945 1.571 1.498 0.893 0.788 0.811 0.748
(0.127) (0.081) (0.086) (0.057) (0.044) (0.050) (0.052)
Notes. The table includes households resident in the same village over both survey rounds, and where the
main respondent was married, and either the head or spouse of her household.
35 This captures the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if she
were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rate through her lifetime, and if she were to survive
from birth to the end of her reproductive life.
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husbands and wives have a living sibling, though roughly one-third of husbands and
nearly half of wives do not have a sibling in the same village. On average, wives have
more living siblings (~5) than husbands (~4.4), but both have similar numbers of
siblings in the same village.
These patterns are in line with post-marital living patterns in this context. Asmentioned
already, though the Chewa were traditionally matrilocal, this tradition seems to be waning
in Mchinji, with roughly half of the wives in our sample moving to their husbands’ village
after marriage. Thus, roughly half the wives in our sample has a sibling in the same village,
while two-thirds ofhusbandshave a sibling in the samevillage. In termsof the typeof sibling
link, husbands and wives have similar numbers of brothers and sisters alive (around two to
three of each type on average), though they each have slightly more brothers than sisters
living in the same village. The table also indicates that they have, on average, far fewer
siblings of either type in the village compared to outside the village.
3. Empirical Model
Our objective is to understand how the amount of risk shared in the face of crop losses
varies with the size of a household’s family network. To do so, we require a measure of
risk sharing, which can be computed in the available data. One measure implied by
the model (assuming utility of the CRRA form) is the deviation of changes in log
consumption from the first-best allocation. Under the first-best allocation, where every
group is stable, each household will consume an equal share of pooled resources. This
means that changes in household-level log consumption should move one-to-one with
aggregate group resources, and be uncorrelated with household-level idiosyncratic
shocks. Following Townsend (1994), full risk sharing would be tested in our context,
using the following regression:
D logðcivtÞ ¼ a0 þ a1DðcropivtÞ þ DXivtcþ lvt þ Divt ; (6)
where Dlog(civt) is the change over time in log consumption for household i in village v
at time t, D(cropivt) indicates the change in crop loss incidence or intensity for
household i between t and t  1, where the crop loss incidence and intensity are
measured as explained in subsection 2.3, lvt are village-time fixed effects, and eivt is an
error term.36 Full risk sharing is consistent with a1 being zero, while a negative value
would imply a rejection of full risk sharing.
Because our main interest is to test for risk sharing according to the size of the
household’s family network (potential group), we augment the above regression with
interactionsbetweenDcropivt anddummyvariables for eachpotential group size in thedata:
D logðcivtÞ ¼ a0 þ a1DðcropivtÞ þ
XN
n¼1
bnDcropivt  1ðSiv ¼ nÞ þ DXivtc
þ kDcropivt  Fiv þ lvt þ Divt :
(7)
36 In online Appendix B, we show how the regression above can be derived from the Townsend (1994)
regression that uses changes in income instead of D(cropivt).
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The term 1(Siv = n) takes the value of one if the household has n brothers or sisters of
the head or spouse and 0 otherwise. DXivt captures changes in household character-
istics, such as household demographics, that could also affect changes in log
consumption. The term kDcropivt  Fiv controls for direct effects of total sibship size
of the husband or wife. lvt denote village-time dummies which capture village-level
aggregate shocks. The coefficients of interest are bn, while the sum of the coefficients
a1 þ
PN
n¼1 bn  1ðSiv ¼ nÞ indicates how well protected a household’s consumption
is in the event of idiosyncratic crop losses. In line with the prevailing social norms in
this context, which indicate that a woman’s brothers have an important role in helping
out their sisters’ households, we conduct the empirical analysis separately for the
brothers and sisters of the head of a household and his spouse.
Ideally, we would control for group-level aggregate shocks, rather than just village-
level aggregate shocks. However, we are unable to do so since we do not observe the
crop losses or consumption of all members of the potential group. As a result, the
group-level aggregate shock is an omitted variable, which will bias the estimates of
interest if it is correlated with potential group size or with crop loss incidence. To assess
the consequences of this, we run some simulations where we generate data from a data
generating process similar to that implied by the model in Section 1 (parameterised
using values similar to those in the data), and use these to shed light on the direction
and magnitude of the resulting omitted variable bias. The findings from this exercise
are in subsection 4.2.
We include changes in crop loss, rather than crop loss in levels, as a measure of
idiosyncratic shock for the following reason: assume we used the crop loss incidence
between periods t and t + 1 as the shock measure. The concern with this is that, in the
absence of perfect risk sharing, a household may already have low consumption at
period t if it experienced a crop loss between periods t  1 and t. Moreover, assume it
experiences another crop loss between t and t + 1, and its consumption remains low at
time t + 1, resulting in little or no change in Dlog(chvt). The household would then
erroneously appear to be perfectly insured. Failing to account for this would lead to the
erroneous conclusion that households are perfectly insured since their consumption
does not respond to a crop loss. For this reason, we define the shock measure as the
difference in incidence (or intensity) of a crop loss between periods t  1 and t and
between t and t + 1.37
This specification can shed light on the shape of the relationship between our
measure of risk sharing and the size of a household’s potential group. However, this
approach, which is fully non-parametric in the number of siblings, may not have
sufficient power to identify statistically significant effects. To improve power, we divide
potential group size into three bands, the cutoffs of which are motivated by the
findings from the non-parametric regression above, and use the following specification
for the empirical analysis:
37 We look at this more formally in online Appendix B. A further issue with focusing on incidence of
rather than changes in crop losses is that we do not account for other risk faced by the household, which may
affect both their consumption smoothing and the shocks they experience. To assess the importance of this
issue in our context, we estimated specifications controlling for other idiosyncratic shocks experienced by the
household (business shocks, theft and marriage break-up) and found it made little difference to the key
coefficients of interest.
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D logðcivtÞ ¼ a0 þ a1DðcropivtÞ þ
XG
g¼1
bnDcropivt  1ðNSg ;iv ¼ 1Þ þ DXivtc
þ kDcropivt  Fiv þ lvt þ Dint ;
(8)
where 1(NSg,iv = 1) takes the value one if the household’s network size is within the
cutoffs associated with band g, and 0 otherwise; and the rest of the variables are as
defined above.38
4. Results
4.1. Main Specification
We first estimate (7), separately for the brothers and sisters of the husband and wife.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the coefficients from these regressions. We have extremely limited
power in these specifications, and thus suppress the confidence intervals for these
coefficients from the figures. Despite the limitations in power, these figures shed light
on the possible shape of the relationship between informal risk sharing and potential
group size in our data.
From the figures, we can see that there are differences in the amount of
consumption smoothing in the face of crop losses, by the size and types of family
relations. In particular, Figure 3 indicates that changes in log consumption are
increasing in the number of brothers of the husband (implying better consumption
smoothing), and decreasing in the number of sisters of the husband. Regarding the
wife’s siblings, we first consider her brothers. The figures indicate that the
consumption of households where she has few brothers is almost perfectly
smoothed, but displays a non-linear, zig-zag pattern the more brothers she has.
This is most clear for the intensity measure: risk sharing worsens as the number of
brothers increases from two to three, four to five and six to seven; it improves as the
number of brothers increases from three to four and from five to six. This is
consistent with the simulations in Section 1. By contrast, no such relationship is
seen for the wife’s number of sisters.
However, we do not have sufficient power to obtain statistically significant
estimates with the non-parametric analysis. To gain power, we pool the number of
siblings of a particular gender into three groups: those with zero siblings of that
gender, those with one to two, and those with three or more. These groups are in
line with the evidence in the Figures 3 and 4, while also ensuring that each group
has sufficient sample size to improve power. Grouping the number of siblings in
this way also prevents us from directly testing the zig-zag pattern between risk
sharing and group size implied by the simulations in Section 1.39 Table 9 presents
the results for this specification, with our two measures for the crop loss shock:
incidence and intensity. The top left (right) panel displays the results pertaining to
38 The exact cutoffs for the different bands are defined in Section 4.
39 The sample sizes of households with large numbers of brothers of the wife are small, which also further
prevents us from testing this implication of the model more directly.
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the husband’s (wife’s) brothers. The bottom left (right) panel displays the results
for the husband’s (wife’s) sisters.
The regression coefficients indicate that households where the wife has more than
three brothers experience much worse risk sharing following crop losses than those
where she has fewer than three (i.e. zero or one to two) brothers. We detect no such
relationship for the brothers of the husband. This finding is replicated across both our
measures of crop losses–incidence and intensity. The coefficient estimates indicate that
households where the wife has more than three brothers cut their consumption by
approximately 26% when hit by a crop loss, while the intensity measure indicates that a
crop loss of a magnitude equivalent to a month’s consumption leads to a reduction in
household consumption of approximately 18%.
The bottom panel of the table indicates worse risk sharing (significant only for the
intensity measure) among households where the husband has any sisters, as can be
evidenced by the positive coefficient on the interaction term for no sisters, and the
negative coefficient on the interaction term for more than three sisters. Such a pattern
is not found for the sisters of the wife or the brothers of the husband. The absence of
any significant differences in risk sharing by the number of sisters of the wife is
consistent with the evidence shown in subsection 2.2 which indicated that sisters of the
wife are less important for risk sharing. However, it is not implied by the model of
Section 1, which assumes that all agents are ex ante identical. In subsection 4.2.3, we
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Fig. 3. Risk Sharing by Number of Brothers and Sisters of Husband
Notes. The figures plot the correlation between changes in log consumption and household crop
loss incidence (left panel) and intensity (right panel) for households with different numbers of
brothers (top panel) and sisters (bottom panel) of the husband. The coefficient for zero
brothers or sisters is normalised to zero, and lower values of the coefficient indicate worse risk
sharing. Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com.
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extend the model to include two types of agents as well as the social norm and consider
whether this extended model can explain this finding.
4.2. Robustness
The analysis in the previous subsection indicates that households where the wife
(husband) has many brothers (sisters) achieve worse risk sharing following an
idiosyncratic crop loss. In this Section, we report on various exercises undertaken to
ascertain the robustness of this finding. In particular, we rule out that this finding is
the result of unobserved common group shocks, or because larger networks are
poorer, or because there is higher competition for resources among networks with
many males, or because larger networks are more vulnerable to crop losses. This
Section deals with each of these in turn.
4.2.1. Aggregate extended family shocks
Asmentioned above, our data allows us to adequately account for common shocks at the
village level but not at the extended family level. This means that we cannot perfectly
control for changes in aggregate resources at the potential group level, possibly biasing
our estimates. We use simulations to assess the magnitude and sign of this bias. We
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Fig. 4. Risk Sharing by the Number of Brothers and Sisters of Wife
Notes. The figures plot the correlation between changes in log consumption and household crop
loss incidence (left panel) and intensity (right panel) for households with different numbers of
brothers (top panel) and sisters (bottom panel) of the wife. The coefficient for zero brothers or
sisters is normalised to zero, and lower values of the coefficient indicate worse risk sharing.
Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com.
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generate data under the assumption that risk is shared according to the model in
Section 1, and parameters are set to match those in our data (where possible). In
particular, we set the group size distribution to match the empirical distribution of
brothers of the wife. Aggregate shocks happen naturally under the income process of the
model in Section 1; because there are only two income levels, the probability that all
family members have the same income realisation is strictly positive. Households’
consumption rules are estimated numerically from the model.40 In Table 10, we assess
how the coefficients on a specification similar to regression three change when we
control for extended family group dummies instead of village dummies. The table
indicates that all the coefficients are indeed biased, as expected. In terms of the sign of
the bias, a1, the coefficient on the Dcrop variable, is biased downwards. By contrast, the
coefficient on Dcropivt 9 1(NSg,iv ≥ 3), b2, is biased upward. So, if anything, we are likely
to be underestimating the negative effect of larger groups on risk sharing. The
underlying intuition for this is that the village dummies do a (marginally) better job of
controlling for group shocks for larger potential groups than for smaller ones. Online
Appendix D provides a more detailed explanation of this.
Table 9
Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dlogcivt Dlogcivt Dlogcivt Dlogcivt
Siblings of husband alive Siblings of wife alive
Shock = crop
Shock =
loss/pred. cons Shock = crop
Shock =
loss/pred. cons
Dshock 0.0834 0.0002 0.0692 0.0552
(0.0784) (0.0507) (0.1046) (0.0607)
No brothers 9 Dshock 0.1452 0.0649 0.0080 0.0642
(0.1519) (0.1518) (0.1568) (0.0618)
≥3 brothers 9 Dshock 0.0088 0.0488 0.2560** 0.1703***
(0.0970) (0.0458) (0.1128) (0.0589)
N 524 519 524 519
R2 0.3047 0.3110 0.3181 0.3320
Dshock 0.0707 0.0809 0.1840* 0.0704
(0.1041) (0.0491) (0.0962) (0.0516)
No sisters 9 Dshock 0.1488 0.1601 0.0715 0.0391
(0.1111) (0.0993) (0.1134) (0.2345)
≥3 sisters 9 Dshock 0.1413 0.0955* 0.0206 0.0073
(0.0997) (0.0482) (0.1133) (0.0569)
N 524 519 524 519
R2 0.3089 0.3202 0.3185 0.3188
Notes. *** Significant at the 1% level; ** the 5% level; * the 10% level. Standard errors clustered at the village
level in parentheses. Regressions pool together all households where a married head or spouse was surveyed,
and who were resident in the same village for both survey rounds. All specifications control for village-time
dummies, changes in household demographics and controls for the number of other siblings interacted with
the crop loss. ‘Crop’ indicates whether or not a household suffered a crop loss, while ‘loss/pred. cons’
measures the intensity of the crop loss as the income lost normalised by predicted household consumption.
40 Full details on the simulations and estimation equation are provided in online Appendix C.
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4.2.2. Are larger networks poorer?
An important concern is that our findings may be driven by unobserved factors that
drive both network size and changes in log consumption. One such set of factors
relates to the fact that households with larger family networks may be poorer. Larger
families have long been observed to be poorer in a variety of contexts. This could make
them less able to provide support to other family members when they need it, thus
leading to worse risk sharing. We provide evidence that our results are not driven by
the fact that larger families are poorer.
First, we fail to find similar results for the sisters of the wife, and for the brothers of
the husband. If the findings were being driven by a family size effect, rather than
being the effect of having many brothers, we would expect to find that households
with many sisters are also less well protected from crop loss events. Of course, this
argument is only valid if households with many sisters and those with many brothers
are not different in other dimensions. To assess whether this is the case, we test
whether households where the wife has ≥3 brothers and <3 sisters are different to
households with ≥3 sisters and <3 brothers, focusing on dimensions that are less
likely to have changed as a result of recent shocks experienced by households. The
findings from this analysis are displayed in Tables 11 and 12 for the husband and
wife, respectively.
As can be seen from the tables, we find only a few differences in the small set of
observable characteristics of the husband and wife in these two types of households. In
particular, there are no significant differences in the amount of education of the
husband or wife in households where the husband (wife) has ≥3 brothers and those
where he (she) has ≥3 sisters. Although males typically have a higher level of education
Table 10
Simulation Results to Assess the Sign and Magnitude of the Bias
from Omitting Controls for Aggregate Extended Family Resources
Coefficients
Avg. a^1 (Group dummies) 0.116
Simulation SE (0.004)
Avg. ~a1 (Village dummies) 0.383
Simulation SE (0.007)
Avg. b^1 (Group dummies) NA
Simulation SE NA
Avg. ~b1 (Village dummies) 0.428
Simulation SE (0.008)
Avg. b^2 (Group dummies) 0.226
Simulation SE (0.009)
Avg. ~b2 (Village dummies) 0.052
Simulation SE (0.010)
Notes. Data simulated to match empirical distribution of brothers of wife.
Exact parameter values, and simulation details are explained in online
Appendix B. l = 46,475.64 MK; and h = 2.25 9 l. a1 is the coefficient
associated with Dcrop, b1 is that associated with No sibling of that type 9
Dcrop; and b2 is that associated with (≥3 siblings) 9 Dcrop. b1 is not
estimated in the specification with group dummies since the associated
variable is perfectly collinear with the group dummy.
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than females, there is no difference in education levels by the sex composition of the
individual’s sibship.41
4.2.3. The role of sisters of the wife
An interesting question is why we do not find a negative effect of the wife’s sisters on
risk sharing. Though this finding is in line with the social norm, the model outlined in
Section 1 does not speak to this issue. To further investigate the role of sisters, we
extend the original model to explicitly allow for the social norm. Specifically, we allow
for two types of agents – brothers (type m) and sisters (type f ) – and impose a social
penalty (which we model as a utility loss) for brothers if they deviate in sub-groups
Table 11
Comparing Characteristics of Households where Husband Has ≥3 Brothers with Those where He
Has ≥3 Sisters
≥3 sis of husband SD ≥3 bros of husband SD p-value of diff
Husband’s characteristics
Years of education 4.815 0.380 5.257 0.329 0.391
Age 37.865 0.923 37.269 0.814 0.632
Chewa 0.931 0.027 0.945 0.028 0.527
Wife’s characteristics
Years of education 3.404 0.282 3.609 0.274 0.582
Age 33.685 0.839 33.027 0.663 0.525
Chewa 0.978 0.014 0.973 0.014 0.768
Notes. ** Significant at 5% level; * at the 10% level. Sample includes households where the wife has three or
more brothers and less than three sisters or three or more sisters and less than three brothers.
Table 12
Characteristics of Households where Wife Has ≥3 Brothers with Those where She Has ≥3 Sisters
≥3 sis of wife SD ≥3 bros of wife SD p-value of diff
Husband’s characteristics
Years of education 5.202 0.322 5.519 0.377 0.517
Age 37.487 0.807 37.404 1.051 0.954
Chewa 0.915 0.035 0.886 0.052 0.392
Wife’s characteristics
Years of education 3.760 0.277 3.872 0.326 0.794
Age 33.241 0.592 32.456 0.925 0.489
Chewa 0.962 0.017 0.972 0.016 0.352
Notes. ** Significant at 5% level; * at the 10% level. Sample includes households where the husband has three
or more brothers and less than three sisters or three or more sisters and less than three brothers.
41 The differences in education levels by gender are likely to be driven by gender differences in the
economic returns to education rather than due to explicit gender discrimination by parents. To our
knowledge, there is no evidence of sex discrimination in investments in children at either the pre-natal or
post-natal stage. Indeed, when we analyse the effects of a randomised infant feeding counselling intervention
in this context by gender, we find no differences in nutritional investments in children by gender. These
results are available on request.
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excluding any of their sisters.42 This formulation captures the social norm that
brothers face: a ‘social penalty’ from leaving their sisters unattended. Online
Appendix A.3 provides more details on the model formulation.43
Solving the model for the same parameter values as GR Example 2 above, we find that
stable groups tend to be more robust to adding sisters than brothers. This is apparent
from Figure 5 which displays the stability status of groups of different sizes and
compositions for two different values of the social penalty. For both values of the penalty
considered, we see that adding a sister to a stable group is less likely to destabilise it
compared to an additional brother. This is most apparent when looking at combinations
with one brother. In both panels, adding sisters (up to four in total) does not destabilise
the group. By contrast, in combinations that include one sister only, adding brothers
beyond two brothers in total destabilises the group. The intuition for this pattern is as
follows: since brothers face a penalty when deviating in sub-groups that cut out their
sisters, they are less likely to do so. Moreover, the penalty also implies that brothers will
make transfers to sisters that would have otherwise been too large to be incentive
compatible, giving sisters an additional incentive to stay in the group. Thus when sisters
are added to the group, neither the brothers nor sisters are likely to be tempted to leave.
Interestingly, we also see thatmore groups are stable as the social penalty increases. This
is intuitive as ahigherpenaltymakes somedeviationsunprofitable.Overall, the simulations
indicate that additional sisters are less likely to destabilise potential groups than brothers,
which explains why we do not find a negative effect of a woman’s sisters on risk sharing.
4.2.4. Number of brothers and competition for resources
Another concern is that there might be more competition for production resources
among families with many males: essentially, if land is passed down to males only, and
there are many males in a particular family, each male would receive a smaller land
plot, and thus would be less able to help his sisters’ households when they face
idiosyncratic shocks. The land descent system in Mchinji is a mixed one: some
households practice a patrilineal system and pass on land to males, whereas others
practice a matrilineal system and pass on land to females. We provide some suggestive
evidence to rule out this channel. In particular, though we do not have information on
the landholdings of siblings of the husband or wife, we can look at whether there are
any differences in the size of land between households where the husband has many
brothers and few sisters compared to those where the husband has many sisters but few
brothers. If the patrilineal form of land descent were dominant in our sample (which
we do not believe it to be), we would expect households where husbands have many
brothers to have smaller plots of land than households where the husband has many
sisters. Examining the data, we see that households where the husband has three or
more brothers and fewer than three sisters have on average 2.9 hectares of land,
whereas those where the husband has three or more sisters and fewer than three
brothers have on average 2.7 hectares of land. This difference is not statistically
42 The penalty is modelled as a utility loss that is increasing in the number of sisters not in the brother’s
deviating sub-group.
43 The simpler model in Section 1 is sufficient for us to obtain the key predictions about group size. We
only require the extended model to study the validity of the placebo test.
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significant, thus providing suggestive evidence that the empirical findings are unlikely
to be driven by this channel.
4.2.5. Potential group size and incidence of shocks
A final concern is that larger extended families could be more vulnerable to crop loss
events, particularly if they are poorer. In this case, the deficiencies in risk sharing
detected above may be a consequence of poverty, rather than a breakdown of risk
sharing due to unstable coalitions.
To see if this is the case, we consider how the incidence and intensity of crop losses
vary with potential group size. To do so, we regress the crop loss and intensity variables
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Fig. 5. Stability of Potential Groups with Different Compositions, Extended Model
Notes. This figure shows whether or not different group compositions are stable to coalitional
deviations, when type m agents are subject to a utility loss (social penalty) a 9 (nf  sf) where
nf = number of type f agents (i.e. sisters), and sf = number of type f agents (sisters) in the
agent’s deviating sub-group. The model parameters are the same as in GR Example 2. Given the
model parameters, a = 0.05 corresponds to around 7.5% of expected utility in autarky; and
a = 0.2 to 30% of expected utility in autarky. The lighter shade indicates stable groups and the
darker shade unstable groups. Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com.
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on our network size variables, pooling data from both survey rounds. Table 13 displays
the results. The table does not indicate that households where the wife has many
brothers are more vulnerable to crop loss events compared to households where the
wife has fewer brothers. Thus, we can rule out that our finding of poor risk sharing
among these households is driven by this channel. Interestingly, we find a negative
coefficient for households where the wife has three or more sisters: such households
are less likely to be affected by a crop loss incident, though there is no difference
detected in the intensity of the crop loss.
5. Calibration
The empirical results show that households where the wife (husband) has a large
number of brothers (sisters) achieve worse risk-sharing outcomes compared to
households where the wife (husband) has fewer brothers (sisters). The theory indicates
that the relationship between risk sharing and potential group size is ambiguous and
sensitive to parameter values: for some combination of parameters, larger potential
groups can offer better risk sharing, while for others, they offer worse risk sharing. We
also, unfortunately, lack sufficient power to test for the zig-zag pattern between risk
sharing and group size implied by the simulations, which would have provided a more
direct test of the model. To investigate whether the findings can be explained by the
theory, we conduct a calibration exercise to see if the model can reproduce the
empirical findings when parameter values are set to be similar to those in our data.
We parameterise the value of the high and low endowment as follows: From the data,
we obtain the average annual household income from agriculture for all households in
Table 13
Potential Group Size and Crop Loss Incidence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crop loss incidence Crop loss intensity Crop loss incidence Crop loss intensity
Siblings of husband alive Siblings of wife alive
No brothers 0.0571 0.0752 0.0058 0.0012
(0.0452) (0.0721) (0.0471) (0.0902)
≥3 brothers 0.014 0.0527 0.0033 0.0599
(0.0262) (0.0424) (0.0275) (0.0428)
N 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,131
R2 0.0244 0.0200 0.0289 0.0216
No sisters 0.0036 0.0083 0.0290 0.0633
(0.0548) (0.0731) (0.0522) (0.0818)
≥3 sisters 0.0075 0.0203 0.0628** 0.0216
(0.0285) (0.0384) (0.0314) (0.0391)
N 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,131
R2 0.0262 0.0198 0.0306 0.0191
Notes. *** Significant at the 1% level; ** the 5% level; * the 10% level. Standard errors clustered at the village
level in parentheses. Regressions pool together all households where a married head or spouse was surveyed
and who were resident in the same village for both survey rounds. ‘Crop loss incidence’ is a dummy variable
that indicates whether the household experienced a crop loss in the previous year (or since the last survey),
while ‘Crop loss intensity’ is the size of the crop loss normalised by predicted household consumption.
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the sample, y. This is equivalent to a weighted average of the high and low endowment
states, where the low endowment state is taken to be the high endowment state less the
crop loss (in nominal terms, without normalising for predicted consumption):
y ¼ p  h þ ð1 pÞðh  cropÞ: (9)
We obtain the values for y, p and crop from the data, and use the formula (9) to back
out the values for h and l, respectively. Table 14 displays the resulting parameters. In
addition to these parameters, we also need to specify a value for the coefficient of
relative risk aversion, q and the discount factor, d. We set q = 1.5 and d = 0.95. The
value for d, which is lower than that typically estimated for developed countries, is
within the range estimated for India by Ligon et al. (2003).44
Figure 6(a) plots the value for average expected utility and group size while Figure 6(b)
plots risk sharing on group size. What is striking is that weighted expected utility
increases with potential group size initially, but then falls before increasing again in a
zig-zag pattern. This pattern can be explained by the fact that given the parameter
values, only groups of size one and two are stable. Larger potential groups would then
sort randomly into the smaller stable groups, for example groups of size three would
sort into groups of size one and two. Since expected utility under autarky is lower than
in a group of size two, this results in a drop in average expected utility for a potential
group of size three. In fact, such an argument holds for all odd-sized potential groups,
while even-sized potential groups would sort into sub-groups of two and attain the same
average expected utility as a group of size two. A similar pattern holds for risk sharing.
Importantly, the drop in expected utility and risk sharing when moving from a
potential group of size two to three matches the pattern found in the data, suggesting
that threats of coalitional deviations may be a possible explanation for the worse risk
sharing for households where the wife has many brothers.
Table 14
Parameter Values for Calibration
Parameter Value
h 61,223.64 MK
l 46,475.64 MK
p 0.63
d 0.95
q 1.5
Notes. This table displays the parameter values used to
calibrate the theoretical model. The values for the
high and low endowments, h and l are in Malawi
Kwacha (MK). The exchange rate at the time of the
survey was roughly US$1 = 140 MK.
44 This value of d is higher than that estimated from experimental elicitation tasks such as Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012), among others. Nonetheless, we experimented with lower discount factors in the calibration
and found that more group sizes became stable as the discount factor was lowered to d = 0.86. This is driven
by potential deviating coalitions becoming unstable faster than the group itself as discount rates fall.
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Fig. 6. Calibration Findings – Average Expected Utility and Potential Group Size
Notes. The figure in the top panel shows the relationship between weighted average expected
utility and potential group size, while that in the bottom panel shows the relationship between
the risk-sharing measure and potential group size. Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.
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6. Conclusion
In this article, we study the relationship between group size and the extent of risk
sharing in a setting with limited commitment and coalitional deviations. In such
environments, two forces are at play in determining the relationship between group
size and risk sharing: on the one hand, larger groups allow for more effective
diversification, and hence better risk sharing. On the other hand, larger groups are
more vulnerable to deviations by sub-groups (coalitions) of households who can
renege on the informal arrangement and continue sharing risk in the smaller sub-
group. Thus, risk-sharing groups will be bounded from the top (Genicot and Ray,
2003). In this paper, we extend the model of Genicot and Ray (2003) and use
simulations to show that the relationship between risk sharing and group size is
theoretically ambiguous. The nature of this relationship is thus an empirical question.
We investigate this question empirically using data from rural Malawi, and overcome
the challenge posed by the fact that the size of the actual risk-sharing group is
endogenous, by considering potential group size, and focusing on a group likely to be
exogenous – siblings of the household head and spouse. Evidence from the anthropo-
logical and sociological literatures indicates that the extended family is a crucial risk-
sharing institution in the setting we study. Moreover, historical, well-documented norms
at play in this context indicate amuchmore important role for a wife’s brothers, than for
her sisters, in providing risk sharing. These norms highlight an important source of
heterogeneity in risk-sharing patterns, and also allow us to construct placebo tests to
alleviate concerns that unobserved factors correlated both with our measures of
potential group size and with the efficiency of risk sharing, are driving our findings.
We consider how well protected a household’s consumption is to idiosyncratic crop
losses – a salient source of risk in this setting – allowing the effects to vary by the size of
the family network of the husband and wife (defined separately by gender of sibling).
In line with the literature on informal risk sharing, we measure the degree of risk
sharing by the correlation between changes in household log consumption and
idiosyncratic crop losses (net of aggregate shocks at the village level). A first non-
parametric specification, which places no restrictions on the shape of the relationship
between the degree of risk sharing and potential group size, indicates that this
relationship is non-linear. However, these estimates are extremely imprecise.
To increase power, we divide group size into three bands, the boundaries of which are
informed by the non-parametric analysis. Estimates from this specification indicate that
householdswhere thewife (husband)hasmanybrothers (sisters) achieveworse risk-sharing
relative to households where she (he) has fewer brothers (sisters). We fail to find a similar
relationship for thewife’s sisters (brothers), which indicates that the relationship is unlikely
to be driven by the fact that households where the husband/wife have many siblings are
poorer. Moreover, we show that these households are not more susceptible to crop losses,
suggesting that the findings are not driven by thismargin either.We also provide suggestive
evidence to rule out other channels, including higher competition for production
resources among extended families with many male siblings. A calibration exercise, where
we parameterise our theoretical framework using information from the data (where
available), indicates that the empirical patterns could be produced by the theory.
© 2018 The Authors.
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Thus, larger potential risk-sharing groups need not yield better risk sharing outcomes,
indicating a role for governments and other actors to implement policies and
mechanisms tobetter protect householdwell-being, taking into account family dynamics.
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